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ABSTRACT 
 
Free vs. Restricted Immigration: Bilateral Country Study 
 
This paper tests the differential effects of the generosity of the welfare state under free 
migration and under policy-controlled migration, distinguishing between source developing 
and developed countries. We utilize free-movement within the EU to examine the free 
migration regime and compare that to immigration into the EU from two other groups, 
developed and developing source countries, to capture immigration-restricted regimes. We 
standardize cross-country education quality differences by using the Hanushek-Woessmann 
(2009) cognitive skills measure. We find strong support for the “magnet hypothesis” under the 
free-migration regime, and the “fiscal burden hypothesis” under the immigration-restricted 
regime even after controlling for differences in returns to skills in source and host countries. 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
We test how the generosity of the welfare state affects the skill composition of immigrants 
across migration regimes. We utilize free-movement within the EU (old core) to examine the 
free migration regime and compare that to immigration into the EU from two other groups to 
capture immigration-restricted regime. We distinguish between immigration from developed 
versus developing source countries. 
 
We find evidence that the generosity of the welfare state adversely affects the skill-
composition of immigrants under free-migration; but it exerts a more positive effect under a 
policy-controlled migration regime relative to a free-migration regime even after controlling for 
the differential returns in skills in source and host countries. Interestingly, these results hold 
for both developed and developing countries, but the effect tends to be larger for developed 
countries. In other words, immigrants from rich countries care more about the welfare state 
relative to those from poorer developing countries.  However once we adjust for educational 
quality, the effect of welfare-state generosity on skill composition increases for immigration 
from developing countries and converges to that experienced by immigration from developed 
countries.  
 
It is clear from our analysis that immigration policies favoring high-skilled migrants need to 
take into account educational quality. Hence, a selective immigration scheme based on years 
of education solely will not be as effective in identifying the high skilled as a points-based 
system where ability (for example, language ability and labor market experience) are 
considered.  
 
Another important implication of our findings is that under free-migration, the generosity of 
the welfare state acts as a magnet for the unskilled. This suggests that harmonizing the 
minimum welfare provision within the EU may be an attractive option to reduce the negative 
effect of the welfare state on the skill composition of immigrants under free-migration. 
 
 
1 Introduction
Public debate on immigration has increasingly focused on the welfare state
amid concerns that immigrants are a scal burden as recipients of the gener-
ous welfare state. There has also been growing literature on how welfare-state
generosity works as a magnet to migrants. However, the e¤ect of welfare pro-
grams on immigration and its composition depends crucially on the policy
regime, namely whether migration is free or restricted. In other words, the
generosity of the welfare state may a¤ect the skill composition of immigrants
di¤erently, depending on the immigration policy adopted. This paper tests
how the generosity of the welfare state a¤ects the skill composition of the
immigrants across these policy regimes.
In a free-migration regime, a typical welfare state with relatively abundant
capital and high total factor productivity (implying relatively high wages for
all skill levels) attracts both unskilled and skilled migrants. On the other
hand, the generosity of the welfare state attracts unskilled (poor) migrants, as
they expect to gain more from the benets of the welfare state than what they
expect to pay in taxes for these benets: that is, they are net beneciaries
of the generous welfare state. In contrast, potential skilled (rich) migrants
are deterred by the generosity of the welfare state. Thus the generosity of
the welfare state shifts the migrant skill composition towards the unskilled.
In the restricted-migration regime, these same considerations lead voters to
open the door wide to skilled migration and slam the door shut on unskilled
migration. Voters are motivated by two considerations: howmigration a¤ects
their wages, and how it bears on the nances of the welfare state. Typically,
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unskilled migration depresses the unskilled wage and boosts the skilled wage.
The opposite occurs with skilled migration. The e¤ect of migration on the
nances of the welfare state is common to all voters of all skills, because
skilled migrants are net contributors to the welfare state, whereas unskilled
migrants are net beneciaries. From a public nance point of view, native-
born voters of all skills would therefore opt for the skilled to come and for
the unskilled to stay away to mitigate the scal burden.
We use core EU countries (old member states) to study empirically the
policy-regime di¤erential e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the
skill composition of migration. Freedom of movement and the ability to reside
and work anywhere within the EU are two of the fundamental rights which
EU member states have must recognise. In contrast, labor mobility into
EU member states from non-EU states is still restricted to various degrees
by national policies.1 The paper utilizes this di¤erence in policy regimes in
EU and non-EU states to test the key di¤erences between free- and policy-
restricted migration, in conjunction with the e¤ect of the welfare state on
the skill composition of immigrants.
The paper, which follows from Cohen and Razin (2009), addresses the
1Despite the legal provision for the free movement of labor among the EU-15 (the old
member countries), the level of cross-border labor mobility is low. Reasons cited for this
include the existence of legal and administrative barriers, the lack of familiarity with other
European languages, moving costs, ine¢ cient housing markets, the limited portability of
pension rights, problems with the international recognition of professional qualications
and the lack of transparency of job openings. The expansion of the EU to 25 member states
in May 2004, was accompanied by concerns over the possibility of a wave of migration 
particularly of the low-skilled from the ten new member states to the EU-15.
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e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill composition of im-
migrants. The paper makes three contributions. First, since welfare benets
might be one factor a¤ecting the composition of migrants, we control for
other potential factors that are likely to a¤ect the selectivity of migration.
As Borjas (1987) argues the characteristics of those who emigrate from a
particular country will depend on that countrys wage distribution. In poor
countries, where the returns to skills are relatively high, there will be a
negative selection of immigrants; whilst in rich countries, where returns
to skills are relatively low, there will be positive selectionof immigrants.
Thus we control for both returns to skills in the source country measured
by income inequality, as well as for the wage-premium skill di¤erential in
the host country. Second, the paper considers immigration from developing
source countries as well as developed ones, since the impact of the generosity
of the welfare state on the immigrant skill composition across these policy
regimes may be di¤erent for (poor) developing countries compared to those
from richer developed ones. We consider here a larger sample of source coun-
tries, which includes a sample of developing countries in addition to non-EU
OECD countries. We employ bilateral data from the year 2000 on 16 EU
countries (14 out of the EU-15 together with Norway and Switzerland, which
benet from free labor mobility bilateral agreements with the EU), 10 non-
EU OECD countries, and 23 developing countries.2 Third, because a proper
measure of immigrant skill is key to our analysis, we correct for educational
quality, an issue which has been ignored in the empirical migration literature.
In this way we attempt to obtain a relatively homogeneous classication of
2Our sample of source countries is dictated by data availability on educational quality.
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skill levels using the Hanushek-Woesmann (2009) measure of cognitive skills.
We form source-host pairs of countries in which only the EU countries (plus
Norway and Switzerland) serve as host countries, whereas all the countries
in the sample serve as source countries. We decompose the source-host pairs
into three groups: a "free-migration" group (source-host pairs within the
EU, plus Norway and Switzerland), a "policy-controlled" group of developed
countries (source-host pairs in which the host countries are the same as in
the former group, and the source countries are from non-EU OECD coun-
tries), and a "policy-controlled" group of developing countries (source-host
pairs in which the host countries are the same as in the former groups, and
the source countries are from LDC countries). The free-restricted migration
decomposition has its origin in the integration process in Europe that started
in the 1950s, and is thus exogenous to the stock of migrants in the EU states
in 2000.
We also control for the potential endogeneity problem : the skill com-
position of migration itself may inuence the votersattitude towards the
generosity of the welfare state. Recalling that skilled migrants are typically
net contributors to the welfare state, whereas unskilled migrants are net
beneciaries, voters in the host country are likely to boost its welfare system
when absorbing high-skill migration and curtail it when absorbing low-skill
migration.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two provides an
overview of the existing literature paying particular attention to the gen-
eral welfare aspects of migration and the interaction between migration and
the welfare state. Section three presents the data sources and discusses the
5
schooling quality measure. Section four presents the econometric model and
compares the ndings for LDC source countries relative to DC source coun-
tries. Section ve concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence on Welfare Migration
Existing literature brings out rich, though mixed, evidence on welfare migra-
tion. Several studies examine whether welfare-state generosity acts as a mag-
net for migrants; see Brueckner (2000) for a detailed review. A few studies
focusing on the US, show that high-benet states have more welfare-recipient
migrants than the low-benet regions, for example, Southwick (1981) and
Gramlich and Laren (1984). Particular groups seem also to be drawn more
by benets than others. For example, Blank (1988) shows that welfare ben-
ets have a signicant positive e¤ect on the location choice of female-headed
households. Similarly, Enchautegui (1997) nds a positive e¤ect of welfare
benets on the migration decision of women with young children. McKinnish
(2005, 2007) also nds evidence of welfare migration, especially for those who
are located close to state borders (where migration costs are lower). Meyer
(2000) employs a conditional logit model, as well as a comparison-group
method, to analyze the 1980 and 1990 US Census data and nds signi-
cant welfare-induced migration, particularly for high school dropouts. Bor-
jas (1999) nds that low-skilled migrants are much more heavily clustered in
high-benet states, in comparison to other migrants or natives. On the other
hand, Gelbach (2004) nds strong evidence of welfare migration in 1980, but
less in 1990, whilst Walker (1994) uses the 1990 US Census data and nds
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no compelling evidence in support of the welfare magnet theory. Using data
for 1979-92, Levine and Zimmerman (1999), show that welfare benets have
little e¤ect on the probability of female-headed households (the recipients of
the benets) to relocate.
Empirical studies on the evidence of welfare migration in Europe and
OECD countries also provide mixed conclusions. Khoudouz-Castezas (2004)
studies emigration from 19th century Europe. He nds that the social insur-
ance legislation, adopted by Bismarck in the 1880s, reduced the incentives of
risk averse Germans to emigrate. He estimates that in the absence of social
insurance, the German emigration rate from 1886 to 1913 would have been
more than double its actual level. Peridy (2006) studies migration rates in 18
OECD host countries from 67 source countries and nds that the host-source
ratio of welfare-state benets (as measured by total public spending) has a
signicant positive e¤ect on migration. De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2006) con-
duct an empirical investigation of migration from outside the EU-15. They
nd that welfare-state benets attract migrants. When interacted with the
education level, welfare benets also show a positive e¤ect on the probability
of the lowest group of educated to immigrate; whereas the probabilities of the
secondary and tertiary education groups are not signicantly a¤ected. Doc-
quier et al. (2006) study the determinants of migration stocks in the OECD
countries in the year 2000, with migrants from 184 countries, classied ac-
cording to three education levels. They nd that the social welfare programs
encourage the migration of both skilled and unskilled workers. However, the
unskilled are motivated by social expenditure much more than the skilled
migrants. Thus they conclude that the skill composition of migrants is ad-
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versely a¤ected by welfare-state benets, that is, welfare benets encourage
migration biased towards the unskilled.
Unlike the above studies, our focus in this paper is about the e¤ect of the
welfare state on the composition of immigrants. Hence, it is paramount to
control for the migration regime (free versus controlled) in order to obtain
unbiased estimates of the generosity of the welfare state on migration (and
on its skill composition). Studies of migration between states within the US,
which are clearly conned to a single migration regime (namely, free migra-
tion), can help only in providing evidence of a free-migration regime. On the
other hand, studies that employ samples conned to the policy-controlled mi-
gration regime, but at the same time employ a model of the migrantschoice
whether to migrate and to which country, are evidently problematic. In this
case, the estimates convey little information about the migrantschoices (and
hence on the welfare state as a magnet to unskilled migrants), but rather on
the migration policy choices of the host country. Finally, studies that refer
to both migration regimes without controlling for them are problematic be-
cause they do not disentangle migration policies in the host countries, and
the individual migrants migration choices in the source countries.
3 Empirical Analysis
Our aim is to test how the generosity of the welfare state a¤ects the skill
composition of immigrants across policy regimes for both developing and
developed source countries after controlling for returns to skills in source
and host countries. It is common to focus on developed countries (OECD
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countries) where skill levels (usually proxied by education attainment) are
comparable given the potential heterogeneity in education quality across de-
veloped and developing countries. We do not conne ourselves to developed
countries in this paper but include a sample of developing countries for which
we are able to control for the quality of education as described below.
In order to identify the di¤erence in the welfare-state benets e¤ect on the
skill composition of immigrants across migration regimes, the decomposition
of the sample into group A, and groups B and C should be exogenous to the
dependent variablethe skill composition of migrants. We argue that this is
indeed the case for EU countries.
3.1 Data
We decompose our sample into three groups as follows. Group A contains
only the source-host pairs of countries which allow free mobility of labor
between them, according to the single-market treaty. Any kind of discrim-
ination between native-born and immigrants, regarding labor market ac-
cessibility and welfare-state benets eligibility is illegal. These are 16 Eu-
ropean countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, Norway
and Switzerland.
Group B includes only the developed source-host pairs of countries within
which the source country residents cannot freely move, work and receive
social benets in any of the host countries. The source countries, however,
are ten developed countries: US, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
Israel, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore.
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Group C includes the developing source-host pairs of countries in which
the source country residents cannot freely move, work and receive social ben-
ets in any of the host countries. Twenty three developing countries are
included: Argentina, Brazil, Chile China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Jor-
dan, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Lebanon, Nigeria,
Peru, Philippines, Tunisia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela.
In both groups B and C, the host countries are the same EU countries as
in group A. We distinguish between LDC and DC source countries and run
separate regressions in order to compare the e¤ect of the welfare state in
both cases. The determinants of emigration and the e¤ects of the generosity
of the welfare state are likely to be di¤erent for poor developing countries
relative to richer, developed ones:- e.g., the gap between the host and source
countries in terms of wages, amenities, social spending and welfare are largers
for developing countries.
The analysis uses bilateral migration data from Docquier and Marfouk
(2006). The data contain bilateral immigrant stocks, based on census and
register data, for the years 1990 and 2000. Immigrants of a working age (25+)
are dened as foreign-born. The immigrants are classied into three educa-
tion levels: low-skilled (0-8 schooling years), medium-skilled (9-12 schooling
years) and high-skilled (13+ schooling years). The data also contain the
stock of the domestic-origin labor force for all the countries.
Data for social spending is based on the OECDs Analytical Database (av-
erage for 1974-1990). Social expenditure encompass all kinds of social public
expenditures, in cash or in kind, including, for instance, old-age transfers,
incapacity related benets, health care, unemployment benets and other
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social expenditure. Social spending is in PPP 1990 US dollars and is divided
by the population of the host country to provide per capita benets.
3.2 Quality of Education and Enforcement of Immi-
gration Policies
Since our interest is in the e¤ect of the welfare state on the skill composition
of immigrants, controlling for the heterogeneity in the skill (education) mea-
surement is important. Policies controlling for immigration typically ignore
di¤erences in the educational quality of source countries. Thus immigrants
with the same years of schooling may be treated equally in a points system,
although in reality they may vary in their labor market productivity, causing
di¤erent scal burdens. This may introduce a bias in our estimatesin par-
ticular for LDC source countries. On one hand, if immigration policies favor
higher educational attainment immigrants and one does not control for the
quality of education, this would overestimate the e¤ect of skill composition
for LDC source countries. On the other hand if high educated immigrants are
of poor quality then their productivity would not be that di¤erent from the
low-skilled ones and they would behave similarly to the low-skilled migrants
in being net recipient rather than contributors to the welfare state, resulting
in an underestimate of the e¤ect of welfare generosity on the skill compo-
sition. Thus not controlling for educational quality is problematic since we
cannot know a priori which way that would bias our results. We control for
educational quality of immigrants from all source countries. Hence our mi-
gration skill composition is adjusted for varying source country skill quality.
Although Docquier and Marfouk (2006) provide comparable educational
11
levels, there is still potentially a very large variation between the quality
of educational degrees across countries. To address this potential problem,
we adjust all the migration stocks for quality of education using Hanushek
and Woessmann (2009) new measures of international di¤erences of cognitive
skills.
Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) use international assessments of stu-
dent achievement such as the First International Mathematics Study (FIMS),
the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). A total of 12
international student achievement tests (ISATs) were collected. Although
varying across the individual assessments, to obtain a common measure of
cognitive skills, they rely upon information about the overall distribution of
scores on each ISAT to compare national responses. In order to compare
performance on the ISATs across tests and over time, they project the per-
formance of di¤erent countries on di¤erent tests onto a common metric. For
that, they develop a common metric both for the level and for the variation
of test performance. To make the level of ISATs comparable, they use the
only available information on educational performance that is consistently
available for comparisons over time: namely, in the form of the National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) from the United States, which
has tested the math, science and reading performance of nationally represen-
tative samples of 9-, 13-, and 17-year-old US students in an intertemporally
comparable way since 1969. The United States is also the only country that
has participated in every ISAT.
Their main measure of cognitive skills is a simple average of all standard-
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ized math and science test scores of the ISATs in which a country partici-
pated. They use a group of countries to serve as a standardization bench-
mark for performance variation over time, and choose 13 OECD countries
that already had substantial enrollment in secondary education in 1964 and
have had relatively stable education systems, which they term the OECD
Standardization Group(OSG) of countries. Then for each assessment, they
calibrate the variance in country mean scores for the subset of the OSG par-
ticipating to the variance observed on the PISA tests in 2000 (when all OSG
countries participated). By combining the adjustments in levels (based on
the US NAEP scores) and the adjustment in variances (based on the OSG),
they directly calculate standardized scores for all countries on all assess-
ments. Each age group and subject is normalized to the PISA standard of
mean 500 and individual standard deviation of 100 across OECD countries
(see Appendix B in Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) for full details).
Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) use their schooling quality measure
to provide evidence on the robust association between cognitive skills and
economic growth. They also nd that home-country cognitive-skill levels
strongly a¤ect the earnings of immigrants in the US labor market in a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences model that compares home-educated to US-educated
immigrants from the same country of origin. Thus suggesting that controlling
for the quality of schooling is important.
We use their imputed average test scores in math and science for primary
through end of secondary school, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided
by 100) for all source countries in our sample as our measure of Education
Quality (EQ). We interact all the migration stock shares by EQ to adjust
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for varying quality of education across countries. It is important to note two
caveats due to the constraints of this quality measure. First, this quality
measure does not vary over time since it is an average for various years thus
we use the same measure for migration stocks in the 1990s and 2000s. Second,
we use the same quality measure for the three educational levels. However,
we check for the robustness of our quality of education by using di¤erent
methods to adjust for quality of education across countries.
Table A1 shows the test scores for math and science scores based on
Hanushek and Woessmann (2009). One interesting issue is that education
quality varies not only between developed and developing countries but also
between developed countries and the EU: the average for the EU (Group A)
is 4.939, whilst for Group B (DCs) it is 5.132 and for Group C (LDCs) it is
only 3.99. This suggests that there might be a need to control for quality of
education not only when considering developing countries but also developed
ones.
4 The Econometric Model
We specify the source-host pair migration stock with the following equation:
mis;h = 
i
0 + 
i
1Rs;h + 
i
2Bh + 
i
3Rs;h Bh + i4Xs;h + i5Xs;h Rs;h + is;h;
(1)
i 2 fe; ug ; is;h = s;h + is;h
Rs;h =
8<: 0; if s; h are in the EU1; if s is not in the EU and h is in the EU
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wheremis;h denotes the stock of migrants of skill level i (comprised of e skilled
and u unskilled), who originated from source country s and reside in host
country h, as a ratio of the stock of all native workers of skill level i in the
source country in the year 2000. Rs;h is a dummy variable, which equals 0 if
the source-host pair exercises free migration, and 1 otherwise. Bh denotes the
log average benets per capita in host country h over the period 1974-1990.
The remaining control variables are denoted by Xs;h, which include the stock
of unskilled migrants, from source country s in host country h; as a ratio of
the stock of all native unskilled migrants in the source country s in the year
1990; a similar ratio for skilled migrants; the proportion of unskilled native-
born workers in the host country h in year 1990; and a similar proportion for
the skilled.3 We also have interaction terms of all variables with the policy
regime dummy variable. The coe¢ cients are depicted by the vectors . The
error term is denoted by is;h, which can be divided into two components: a
skill-independent e¤ect, s;h, and a skill-dependent term, is;h.
This simple model estimates the e¤ects of the benets per capita (and
the other control variables) on the migration share, mis;h, for each skill level
i = e; u. Note that s;h reects some omitted variables which are skill-
independent. In order to avoid the omitted-variable bias which is skill-
independent, we dene a skill-di¤erence model (a version of di¤erence-in-
di¤erence model), by subtracting the two equations in (1) and obtain
4ms;h = 14Rs;h+24Bh+34Rs;h Bh+44Xs;h+54Xs;hRs;h+s;h;
(2)
3The last two control variables do not add up to one because we omitted workers with
fewer than eight years of schooling.
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where 4 is the skill-di¤erence operator.
The dependent variable, 4ms;h = mes;h   mus;h, can be considered as a
measure for the skill composition of migrants in the year 2000. Equation (2)
estimates the relative e¤ects of the regressors on 4ms;h. A positive estima-
tion of a certain coe¢ cient indicates a positive e¤ect on the skill composition
measure of the migrants, and vice versa. Note that the e¤ect of welfare state
generosity on the skill composition of the migrants under free migration is
captured in the above equation by the coe¢ cient 2. Therefore, the null
hypothesis describing this e¤ect is:
2 < 0: (3)
In addition, the e¤ect of welfare state generosity on the skill composition
of migrants in the case of restricted migration is captured by the coe¢ cient
2 +3. Therefore the null hypothesis describing this e¤ect is:
3 > 0: (4)
An important statistical feature of the di¤erence-in-di¤erence model is
that it eliminates the skill-independent error term, s;h. Any variable whose
impact on migration is skill-invariant drops out. Furthermore, by including
past migration stocks by skill in 1990 as a part of Xs;h, we are able to account
for other invariant e¤ects.
We also control for other factors that are likely to be skill dependent as
follows. First, we attempt to control for other immigration policy measures
in the host country that might have an e¤ect on the skill composition of
immigrants. We use refugees as a share in total immigrants in 1990 in the
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host country based on the United Nations Population Division Statistics.4 To
capture the e¤ect of family re-unication schemes adopted in host countries
we use the stock of past migrants from the source country in the host country
in 1990. Both variables are expected to have a negative impact on the migrant
skill mix, since both policies attract low-skilled migrants.
Second, since the generosity of the welfare state might be one of the
factors inuencing immigration and its composition, we need to control for
other push-pull factors. One important determinant of migration is the wage
di¤erential or the skill di¤erential between source and host countries. We
use real GDP per capita (PPP) in 1990, constant US dollars, for both host
and source countries in the absence of data on wages in the source countries.
We also use average unemployment rates (average for 1990-1995) in both
source and host countries.5 In addition, to capture better other pull factors
which are likely to a¤ect immigration selectivity a battery of controls is used:
(i) inequality measures (Gini coe¢ cient) in the source country in 1990;6 (ii)
as a proxy for the returns to skill in the host country, the log value of the
skilled-unskilled native labor stock ratio in 1990; (iii) instead of (ii), for the
host country, the ratio of skilled-unskilled wage di¤erential measured by the
ratio of labor compensation per employee in US dollars PPP in 19957; and
4Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain data on the number or share of refugees
for source-host pairs. We have also experimented with using the number of refugees and
asylum seekers in the host in 1997, and all our results were robust.
5Both GDP per capita and unemployment rates are from the World Bank World De-
velopment Indicators.
6Data on the Gini coe¢ cient are from the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality
Database (WIID) 2008.
7Skilled is nancial and business services and unskilled is construction. Source OECD
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(iv) the di¤erence in unemployment rates between the skilled and unskilled
in the host country in 1998.8
Additional controls, such as the distance between source-host countries,
which might deter unskilled immigrants more than skilled ones, and same-
language in source-host countries, which might make immigration particu-
larly attractive for unskilled workers are included. We also control for quan-
tity of education using average years of schooling (+25 years ) in the source
country, extracted from the World Bank World Development Indicators, in
addition to adjusting for educational quality as mentioned above.
A potential endogeneity problem may arise in particular between the
level of benets in the host country, Bh , and the skill composition of the
migrants, ms;h, because skilled immigrants can inuence the political eco-
nomic equilibrium level of benets. One way to address this problem is to
use the average level of benets over a long period before the year 2000, as
we indeed do (using 1974-1990 data). Recall that we also control for the past
migration stock rate (in 1990). Thus only migration from 1990-2000 is to be
explained by the lagged benet variable, which is completely predetermined.
In addition, we also instrument the lagged level of benets in the host
country, Bh, using the legal origin in the host country (English, Scandinavian,
or French-German) as an instrument. We also instrument the interaction
Rs;h:Bhusing the interaction between the legal origin and R:The legal origin,
Stat.
8Unemployment rates of the population aged 25-64 by level of education; skilled is
dened as upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education levels 3-4 (ISCED,
1997) and unskilled is dened as pre-primary, primary and lower-secondary education
levels 0-2 (ISCED, 1997). Source: Eurostat.
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a century-old construct, was put in place without having the 2000 migration
in mind. The legal origin is, however, closely linked to national attitudes
towards the generosity of the welfare state, and its institutional setups. It
is therefore likely to be strongly correlated with Bh, yet with little direct
relationship to the skill composition of migrants in the year 2000, ms;h.
4.1 Main Findings
Table 1 presents the OLS estimation results for both DCs and LDCs for
our variables of interest. Our rst hypothesis relates to the e¤ect of welfare
state benets on the skill composition of immigrants within free-migration
regime. This hypothesis is indeed conrmed (the rst row) for Group A. The
coe¢ cient is negative and signicant. That is, the generosity of the welfare
state adversely a¤ects the skill composition of migrants in the free-migration
regime, capturing the market-based supply-side e¤ect. The inclusion of the
returns to skill proxy measured by the skilled-unskilled native labor stocks
ratio in the host country in 1990 (column 2), or (column 3) the skilled-
unskilled wage di¤erential does not have much of an e¤ect on the magnitude
or signicance of the coe¢ cients of the welfare-state benets.
Our second hypothesis relates to the considerations of the host coun-
trys voters in policy-controlled migration regimes. We have argued that the
di¤erence between the e¤ect of scal benets between the controlled and free-
migration regimes should be positive. Indeed, the coe¢ cient is positive and
signicantly di¤erent than that in the free migration regimes (second row)
for DCs (Group B). That is, the e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare state
on the skill composition of migrants is positively a¤ected by the migration
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policy of the host countries. However the coe¢ cient is not always signicant
for LDCs (Group C) suggesting our a priori concern about the endogeneity
of welfare benets. Similar results are obtained when using migration stocks
that are adjusted for quality of education, i.e. ms;hEQs (see Table 2).
Turing to Table 3 which presents the IV estimates, it is important to note
that the rst stage Cragg-Donald F-statistics show that our instruments are
not subject to weak instrument concerns. Indeed, we nd evidence for our
rst hypothesis, i.e. a negative and signicant e¤ect of welfare-state bene-
ts on the skill composition of immigrants within a free-migration regime.
The generosity of the welfare-state adversely a¤ects the skill composition of
migrants in the free-migration regime. As predicted, using the IV, we nd
the e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare-state on the skill composition of
migrants under the policy-controlled migration regime is positive, for both
developed (Group B, Column 1) and developing countries (Group C, Column
4). This result also holds after controlling for all the other push-pull factors
(Columns 2 and 3 for DCs and Columns 5 and 6 for LDCs).
One important nding is that the e¤ect of the generosity tends to be larger
for DCs relative to LDCs. In other words, a generous welfare state leads to
a larger positive e¤ect on the skill composition of migrants from DCs under
policy-controlled migration relative to that from LDCs. Overall, our results
suggest that 1% increase in welfare-state benet spending would improve the
skill composition of LDCs migrants by around 2.0% and of DCs migrants by
around 3.5%. There are potentially several reasons for the di¤erence of wel-
fare spending on migrant skill composition between LDCs and DCs. First, it
could be because policies controlling for immigration typically ignore di¤er-
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ences in educational quality, thus we correct for low schooling quality, since
immigrants with the same years of schooling may vary in their productivity
in the labor market, causing di¤erent scal burdens. Second, it could also be
due to the family re-unication and refugee immigration policies adopted by
EU countriesdistorting the skill composition for LDCs immigrantswhich
we control for by using imperfect proxies: namely, percentage of refugees in
host and total migrant stock from source in host rather than the percentage
of refugees in host from source and the stock of family reunion migrants from
source in host.
Table 4 presents IV estimates using migration stocks that are adjusted
for quality of education. It is clear that our previous results pertaining to
the negative e¤ect of the welfare-state benets on the skill composition of
immigrants within the free-migration regime but a positive e¤ect within the
restricted-migration regime for both Groups B and C hold after adjusting for
the quality of education. However, it is also worth noting that our ndings
suggest that controlling for quality of education does strengthen the positive
e¤ect of the skill composition of LDCs and hardly changes the estimate for
DCs, thus narrowing the gap between the e¤ects for LDCs vs. DCs. Thus
a 1% increase in welfare-state benet spending would improve the skill com-
position of LDCs migrants by around 2.5% and of DCs migrants by around
3.4%.
Turning to the other control variables, the variables capturing immigra-
tion policies adopted in the EU have negative e¤ects, as expected: the share
of refugees in total migrants in the host country in 1990 has a negative, albeit
insignicant, e¤ect whilst the total migrant stock from the source country
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in the host country in 1990 has a negative insignicant e¤ect on the skill
composition for DC immigrants and a negative signicant impact on LDC
immigrant skill composition.
Finally, examining the di¤erential e¤ect of returns to skills under the two
policy regimes, we nd, interestingly, that inequality in the source country
has a negative signicant e¤ect on the skill mix of migrants from both LDCs
and DCs under restrictive migration and a positive e¤ect under free migra-
tion. As for the relative returns to skill in the host, the higher the high-low
labor ratio, the lower are the returns to skill and the lower are the skill com-
position of immigrants. However, this e¤ect seems to be signicant only for
DCs. Indeed, using the wage di¤erential between high- and low- skilled in the
host country, which is a better measure of returns to skills, shows that there
is a positive relationship between the returns to skill and the skill composi-
tion of migrants for both DCs and LDCs under controlled migration, and no
di¤erential e¤ect for free migration. Thus overall, the results indicate that
even after controlling for returns to skills, the generosity of the welfare state
matters for the skill composition of immigrants.
4.2 Robustness Tests
We check the robustness of our ndings as follows. Our robustness tests are
divided into two parts. First, we check the robustness of our results using
di¤erent methods to adjust for the quality of education. We use relative
quality of education in the source country versus the host country and in-
teract that with the migration stocks, i.e. ms;h:
EQs
EQh
(Table 5). We then
adjust only the high-skilled migration stock by interacting with the relative
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source to host quality of education i.e. mes;hEQs (Table 6). All our results
are robust and the magnitude of the impact of the welfare-state spending on
the compositional migration mix is similar to our results in Table 4.
Second, we use di¤erent cuts for the skill composition. We examine the
di¤erence between high from medium plus low (Table 7). Then we observe
the di¤erence between high plus medium from low (Table 8). We present the
estimates using education quality adjusted migration stocks. The results are
perfectly in line with our main ndings.
5 Conclusion
Welfare generosity is seen by many as a magnet for immigration. Yet, the
e¤ect of the welfare state on immigration and its composition depends on
whether the adopted migration policy regime is free or controlled. We argue
that welfare-state benets attract unskilled migrants because they contribute
to tax revenues less than what they gain from benets; and this generosity
deters skilled immigrants, because they contribute more in taxes than they
receive in benets. In sharp contrast, the e¤ect of an increase in the gen-
erosity of the welfare state on the skill composition of migrants is positive,
if migration is controlled by policy. Being net contributors to the welfare
state, skilled migrants can help nance a more generous welfare-state sys-
tem. Thus they are preferred by policy makers to unskilled migrants. The
present paper analyzes the e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the
skill composition of migrants distinguishing, between immigrants from LDCs
versus DCs. We examine the e¤ect of a generous the welfare-state (measured
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as per capita social spending) on the skill composition of migrants under
free- versus controlled- migration regimes controlling for the role played by
returns to skills in both the source and host countries.
We use bilateral data from the year 2000 on 16 EU countries (14 out of the
EU-15 together with Norway and Switzerland which benet from free labor
mobility bilateral agreements with the EU), 10 non-EU OECD countries, and
23 LDC countries. The paper utilizes the di¤erence in policy regimes across
EU and non-EU states, distinguishing between DCs and LDCs in order to
test for key di¤erences between free and policy-restricted migration in terms
of the e¤ect of the welfare state on the skill composition of immigrants. We
also control for schooling quality, given the potential bias, since immigrants
with the same years of schooling may vary in their productivity in the labor
market, causing di¤erent scal burdens. We nd evidence in support of our
hypothesis that the generosity of the welfare state adversely a¤ects the skill-
composition of migrants under free-migration; but it exerts a more positive
e¤ect under a policy-controlled migration regime relative to a free-migration
regime even after controlling for the di¤erential returns in skills in source and
host countries. Interestingly, these results hold for both DCs and LDCs, but
the e¤ect tends to be larger for DCs. However once we adjust for educational
quality, the e¤ect of welfare-state generosity on skill composition increases for
immigration from LDCs and converges to that experienced by immigration
from DCs.
Our ndings highlight the importance of controlling for educational qual-
ity when studying high skilled migration from LDCs. In addition, it is clear
from our analysis that immigration policies favoring high-skilled migrants do
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not take into account educational quality. Our ndings also indicate that
other immigration policies such as family reunion and asylum seekers, also
a¤ect the skill composition of migrants from developing countries.
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Table 1: OLS Estimates 
 Dependent Variable: High-Low Difference in Migration Stock Shares in 2000 
 DCs 
(Groups A & B) 
LDCs 
(Groups A & C) 
 
Welfare generosity  
      
benefits per capita (logs)  -0.116 -0.129 -0.124 -0.124 -0.144 -0.153 
1974-90 (host) (0.058)** (0.059)** (0.048)** (0.057)** (0.054)*** (0.051)*** 
benefits per capita (logs)  0.120 0.139 0.140 0.104 0.104 0.116 
1974-90 (host) X R (0.055)** (0.065)** (0.056)** (0.066) (0.079) (0.066)* 
 
Past migration stocks 
      
migration stock share in  -0.716 -0.716 -0.707 -0.609 -0.610 -0.605 
1990 - low-skilled (0.132)*** (0.127)*** (0.140)*** (0.128)*** (0.128)*** (0.137)*** 
migration stock share in  1.728 1.761 1.731 0.278 0.555 0.546 
1990 - low-skilled X R (0.172)*** (0.173)*** (0.169)*** (0.196) (0.234)** (0.226)** 
migration stock share in  1.060 1.060 1.047 0.960 0.958 0.952 
1990 - high-skilled (0.149)*** (0.144)*** (0.155)*** (0.145)*** (0.146)*** (0.153)*** 
migration stock share in  -0.725 -0.726 -0.714 -0.478 -0.623 -0.616 
1990 - high-skilled X R (0.148)*** (0.142)*** (0.151)*** (0.156)*** (0.169)*** (0.173)*** 
 
Returns to skills 
      
high-low labor ratio in   -0.804   0.215  
1990 - (host)  (0.297)***   (0.395)  
high-low labor ratio in   0.275   -0.009  
1990 (host) X F  (0.490)   (0.656)  
high-low wage diff. in    -0.004   -0.002 
1995 (host)    (0.003)   (0.003) 
high-low wage diff. in   0.006   0.004 
1995 - (host) X R   (0.003)**   (0.003)* 
Gini in 1990 (source)  0.352 0.388  0.301 0.304 
  (0.116)*** (0.124)***  (0.119)** (0.129)** 
Gini in 1990 (source) X R  -0.349 -0.376  -0.274 -0.268 
  (0.140)** (0.146)**  (0.143)* (0.155)* 
       
high-low unemp. rate diff.  0.005 0.001  0.004 0.006 
in 1990 (host)   (0.003)* (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)* 
high-low unemp. rate diff.  -0.002 -0.004  -0.005 -0.008 
in 1990 - (host) X F  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005)* 
Observations 384 384 360 601 570 534 
R-squared 0.864 0.870 0.874 0.833 0.809 0.814 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
     
      
    
Table 2: OLS Estimates Using Migration Stock Adjusted by Educational Quality 
 Dependent Variable: High-Low Difference in Migration Stock (EQ) Shares in 2000 
 DCs 
(Groups A & B) 
LDCs 
(Groups A & C) 
 
Welfare generosity 
      
benefits per capita  -0.575 -0.673 -0.682 -0.581 -0.697 -0.753 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.279)** (0.266)** (0.228)*** (0.274)** (0.269)*** (0.250)*** 
benefits per capita (logs)  0.597 0.694 0.695 0.566 0.615 0.601 
1974-90 (host) X R (0.275)** (0.312)** (0.276)** (0.305)* (0.346)* (0.266)** 
 
Past migration stocks 
      
migration stock (EQ)  -0.694 -0.695 -0.685 -0.593 -0.586 -0.578 
share 1990 - low (0.148)*** (0.143)*** (0.157)*** (0.141)*** (0.138)*** (0.148)*** 
migration stock (EQ) 1.706 1.739 1.715 0.314 0.322 0.313 
share 1990 - low X R (0.175)*** (0.168)*** (0.171)*** (0.208) (0.211) (0.207) 
migration stock (EQ) 1.035 1.035 1.023 0.939 0.928 0.921 
share 1990 - high  (0.166)*** (0.162)*** (0.173)*** (0.159)*** (0.156)*** (0.165)*** 
migration stock (EQ) -0.700 -0.705 -0.691 -0.480 -0.474 -0.465 
share 1990- high X R (0.163)*** (0.158)*** (0.168)*** (0.170)*** (0.168)*** (0.174)*** 
 
Returns to skills 
      
high-low labor ratio in   -3.886   0.760  
1990 - (host)  (1.356)***   (1.962)  
high-low labor ratio in   1.157   0.077  
1990 (host) X F  (2.286)   (2.783)  
high-low wage diff. in   -0.019   -0.009 
1995 - (host)   (0.012)   (0.012) 
high-low wage diff. in    0.028   0.027 
1995 (host) X R   (0.013)**   (0.014)* 
Gini in 1990 (source)  1.820 1.937  1.622 1.909 
  (0.582)*** (0.625)***  (0.511)*** (0.559)*** 
Gini in 1990 (source)   -1.677 -1.849  -1.280  -1.677 
X R  (0.668)** (0.702)***  (0.581)** (0.608)*** 
       
high-low unemp. rate   0.025 0.014  0.026 0.038 
diff. in 1990 - (host)  (0.011) (0.014)  (0.016) (0.017)** 
high-low unemp. rate   -0.010 -0.022  -0.026 -0.043 
diff. in 1990 (host) X F  (0.020) (0.021)  (0.023) (0.022)* 
Observations 384 384 360 569 569 533 
R-squared 0.861 0.868 0.871 0.827 0.832 0.836 
Notes: All the migration stocks are adjusted for the quality of education in the source country, i.e. EQ =Δms,h EQs; robust 
standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Table 3: IV Estimates 
Dependent Variable: High-Low Difference in Migration Stock Shares in 2000 
 DCs 
(Groups A & B) 
LDCs 
(Groups A & C) 
 
Welfare generosity 
      
Fitted benefits per capita   -0.162 -0.207 -0.174 -0.181 -0.180 -0.141 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.079)** (0.092)** (0.074)** (0.081)** (0.090)** (0.073)* 
Fitted benefits per capita   0.268 0.255 0.203 0.201 0.209 0.165 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) X R (0.091)*** (0.101)** (0.080)** (0.089)** (0.105)** (0.085)* 
 
Past migration skills 
      
migration stock share in  -0.709 -0.708 -0.701 -0.591 -0.582 -0.580 
1990 - low-skilled (0.130)*** (0.128)*** (0.139)*** (0.133)*** (0.134)*** (0.140)*** 
migration stock share in  1.776 1.782 1.753 0.558 0.558 0.556 
1990 - low-skilled X R (0.168)*** (0.165)*** (0.171)*** (0.232)** (0.234)** (0.226)** 
migration stock share in  1.053 1.050 1.042 0.944 0.932 0.932 
1990 - high-skilled (0.148)*** (0.147)*** (0.155)*** (0.150)*** (0.151)*** (0.156)*** 
migration stock share in  -0.728 -0.724 -0.715 -0.624 -0.612 -0.613 
1990 - high-skilled X R (0.149)*** (0.147)*** (0.153)*** (0.168)*** (0.172)*** (0.172)*** 
 
Returns to skills 
      
high-low labor ratio in   -1.072   0.060  
1990 - (host)  (0.368)***   (0.468)  
high-low labor ratio in   0.671   0.523  
1990 (host ) X F  (0.540)   (0.706)  
high-low wage diff. in    -0.003   -0.002 
1995 (host)    (0.002)   (0.003) 
high-low wage diff. in   0.006   0.006 
1995 - (host) X R   (0.003)**   (0.003)* 
Gini in 1990 (source)  0.330 0.349  0.310 0.312 
  (0.118)*** (0.127)***  (0.120)*** (0.128)** 
Gini in 1990 (source) X R  -0.353 -0.397  -0.280 -0.273 
  (0.143)** (0.148)***  (0.144)* (0.154)* 
       
high-low unemp. rate   0.007 0.003  0.005 0.009 
diff. 1990 (host)   (0.003)** (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003)** 
high-low unemp. rate    -0.004 -0.005  -0.008 -0.008 
diff. 1990 - (host) X F  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.005)* 
 
Immigration policies 
      
Total migrant stock  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
in 1990 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)** 
Share of refugees in 1990 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
Cragg-Donald F- statistics 
 
52.00 
 
59.04 
 
63.13 
 
86.02 
 
98.46 
 
99.07 
Observations 384 384 360 538 538 504 
R-squared 0.865 0.871 0.875 0.811 0.815 0.821 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Table 4: IV Estimates Using Migration Stock Adjusted by Educational Quality 
Dependent Variable: High-Low Difference in Migration Stock (EQ) Shares in 2000 
 
 DCs 
(Groups A & B) 
LDCs 
(Groups A & C) 
Welfare generosity       
Fitted benefits per capita   -0.797 -1.022 -0.864 -0.854 -0.896 -0.882 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.375)** (0.444)** (0.357)** (0.372)** (0.428)** (0.354)** 
Fitted benefits per capita   1.316 1.262 1.000 1.032 1.058 0.916 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) X R (0.441)*** (0.486)*** (0.387)** (0.409)** (0.474)** (0.384)** 
 
Past migration stocks 
      
migration stock (EQ)  -0.686 -0.685 -0.677 -0.598 -0.588 -0.588 
share 1990 - low  (0.147)*** (0.145)*** (0.156)*** (0.143)*** (0.143)*** (0.151)*** 
migration stock (EQ)  1.749 1.763 1.734 0.563 0.566 0.559 
share 1990 - low X R (0.172)*** (0.171)*** (0.177)*** (0.210)*** (0.213)*** (0.213)*** 
migration stock (EQ) 1.027 1.024 1.014 0.941 0.927 0.926 
share 1990 - high  (0.165)*** (0.164)*** (0.173)*** (0.162)*** (0.163)*** (0.168)*** 
migration stock (EQ) -0.701 -0.698 -0.689 -0.635 -0.623 -0.619 
share 1990 - high X R (0.164)*** (0.163)*** (0.170)*** (0.171)*** (0.175)*** (0.178)*** 
 
Returns to skills 
      
high-low labor ratio in   -5.303   0.040  
1990 - (host)  (1.767)***   (1.798)  
high-low labor ratio in   3.374   1.903  
1990 (host) X F  (2.604)   (3.007)  
high-low wage diff. in    -0.015   -0.014 
1995 (host)    (0.011)   (0.012) 
high-low wage diff. in   0.031   0.025 
1995 - (host) X R   (0.014)**   (0.015)* 
Gini in 1990 (source)  1.694 1.792  1.612 1.887 
  (0.600)*** (0.645)***  (0.602)*** (0.636)*** 
Gini in 1990 (source)   -1.787 -1.999  -1.542 -1.822 
X R  (0.723)** (0.751)***  (0.713)** (0.732)** 
       
high-low unemp. rate   0.035 0.009  0.020 0.025 
diff. 1990 (host)   (0.015)** (0.013)  (0.013) (0.014)* 
high-low unemp. rate   -0.023 -0.023  -0.034 -0.037 
diff. 1990 - (host) X F  (0.024) (0.022)  (0.026) (0.022)* 
 
Immigration policies 
      
Total migrant stock in 1990 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)** 
Share of refugees in 1990 -0.012 -0.004 -0.011 -0.010 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
 
Cragg-Donald F- statistics 
 
51.89 
 
59.10 
 
63.11 
 
85.90 
 
99.55 
 
94.69 
Observations 384 384 360 538 538 504 
R-squared 0.861 0.868 0.872 0.810 0.814 0.817 
Notes: All the migration stocks are adjusted for the quality of education in the source country, i.e. EQ =Δms,h EQs; robust 
standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
  
     
     
 
  
Table 5: Robustness Test: Using Migration Stock Adjusted by Relative Educational Quality; IV Estimates 
Dependent Variable: High-Low Difference in Migration Stock (REQ) Shares in 2000 
 
 DCs 
(Groups A & B) 
LDCs 
(Groups A & C) 
Welfare generosity       
Fitted benefits per capita   -0.169 -0.210 -0.176 -0.175 -0.193 -0.166 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.078)** (0.091)** (0.074)** (0.077)** (0.089)** (0.073)** 
Fitted benefits per capita   0.268 0.260 0.206 0.209 0.235 0.189 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) X R (0.089)*** (0.099)*** (0.079)*** (0.085)** (0.105)** (0.085)** 
 
Past migration stocks 
      
migration stock (REQ)  -0.685 -0.685 -0.678 -0.601 -0.575 -0.574 
share 1990 - low  (0.151)*** (0.149)*** (0.160)*** (0.146)*** (0.144)*** (0.151)*** 
migration stock (REQ)  1.744 1.754 1.724 0.549 0.305 0.304 
share 1990 - low X R (0.171)*** (0.169)*** (0.175)*** (0.216)** (0.210) (0.207) 
migration stock (REQ) 1.022 1.022 1.013 0.939 0.914 0.914 
share 1990 - high  (0.169)*** (0.168)*** (0.176)*** (0.165)*** (0.164)*** (0.168)*** 
migration stock (REQ) -0.698 -0.692 -0.682 -0.628 -0.459 -0.460 
share 1990 - high X R (0.167)*** (0.165)*** (0.172)*** (0.175)*** (0.175)*** (0.178)*** 
 
Returns to skills 
      
high-low labor ratio in   -1.102   -0.019  
1990 - (host)  (0.356)***   (0.416)  
high-low labor ratio in   0.707   0.524  
1990 (host) X F  (0.534)   (0.612)  
high-low wage diff. in    -0.003   -0.002 
1995 (host)    (0.002)   (0.003) 
high-low wage diff. in   0.007   0.006 
1995 - (host) X R   (0.003)**   (0.003)* 
Gini in 1990 (source)  0.372 0.398  0.360 0.367 
  (0.119)*** (0.127)***  (0.119)*** (0.128)*** 
Gini in 1990 (source) X R  -0.345 -0.384  -0.297 -0.295 
  (0.142)** (0.148)***  (0.140)** (0.150)** 
       
high-low unemp. rate diff.   0.007 0.002  0.006 0.009 
in 1990 (host)   (0.003)** (0.002)  (0.003)* (0.003)*** 
high-low unemp. rate diff.   -0.005 -0.005  -0.009 -0.009 
in 1990 - (host) X F  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005)* 
 
Immigration policies 
      
Total migrant stock in 1990 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)** 
Share of refugees in 1990 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 384 384 360 538 569 533 
R-squared 0.863 0.867 0.871 0.805 0.830 0.835 
Notes: All the migration stocks are adjusted for the quality of education, i.e. REQ =Δms,h. (EQs/EQh ); robust standard errors in 
parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Table 6: Using High-Skilled Educational Quality Adjusted Migration Stock; IV Estimates 
Dependent Variable: High (HEQ)-Low Difference in Migration Stock Shares in 2000 
 
 DCs 
(Groups A & B) 
LDCs 
(Groups A & C) 
Welfare generosity       
Fitted benefits per capita   -0.158 -0.206 -0.171 -0.179 -0.161 -0.135 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.076)** (0.089)** (0.072)** (0.075)** (0.078)** (0.068)** 
Fitted benefits per capita   0.265 0.253 0.200 0.191 0.184 0.159 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) X R (0.089)*** (0.098)** (0.078)** (0.080)** (0.092)** (0.074)** 
 
Past migration stocks 
      
migration stock   -0.706 -0.706 -0.697 -0.620 -0.614 -0.610 
share 1990 - low  (0.128)*** (0.125)*** (0.136)*** (0.123)*** (0.123)*** (0.130)*** 
migration stock  1.796 1.804 1.773 0.440 0.443 0.442 
share 1990 - low X R (0.165)*** (0.161)*** (0.167)*** (0.158)*** (0.160)*** (0.154)*** 
migration stock (HEQ) 1.049 1.047 1.036 0.967 0.959 0.955 
share 1990 - high  (0.144)*** (0.142)*** (0.150)*** (0.140)*** (0.141)*** (0.145)*** 
migration stock (HEQ) -0.711 -0.708 -0.698 -0.684 -0.679 -0.677 
share 1990 - high X R (0.144)*** (0.141)*** (0.148)*** (0.150)*** (0.152)*** (0.153)*** 
 
Returns to skills 
      
high-low labor ratio in   -1.119   0.236  
1990 - (host)  (0.369)***   (0.341)  
high-low labor ratio in   0.655   0.151  
1990 (host ) X F  (0.533)   (0.592)  
high-low wage diff. in    -0.003   -0.003 
1995 (host)    (0.002)   (0.003) 
high-low wage diff. in   0.006   0.004 
1995 - (host) X R   (0.003)**   (0.003) 
Gini in 1990 (source)  0.333 0.352  0.328 0.113 
  (0.118)*** (0.127)***  (0.117)*** (0.126)*** 
Gini in 1990 (source) X R  -0.342 -0.384  -0.310 -0.305 
  (0.333)** (0.352)**  (0.328)** (0.150)** 
       
high-low unemp. rate diff.   0.007 0.002  0.001 0.004 
in 1990 (host)   (0.003)** (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003)** 
high-low unemp. rate diff.   -0.005 -0.005  -0.005 -0.007 
in 1990 - (host) X F  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004) 
 
Immigration policies 
      
Total migrant stock in 1990 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.022 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)** 
Share of refugees in 1990 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 384 384 360 538 538 504 
R-squared 0.875 0.881 0.885 0.820 0.826 0.831 
Notes: High-skilled migration stocks are weighted for the relative quality of education, i.e. HEQ =mes,h.EQs;  robust standard 
errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Table 7: Robustness Test: Using Migration Stock Weighted by Educational Quality; IV Estimates  
Dependent Variable: High - Medium and Low Difference in Migration Stock (EQ) Shares in 2000 
 
 
DCs 
(Groups A and B) 
LDCs 
(Groups A and C) 
Welfare generosity     
Fitted benefits per capita   -0.790 -0.866 -0.472 -0.769 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.307)** (0.313)*** (0.290) (0.305)** 
Fitted benefits per capita   0.893 1.177 0.567 0.768 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) X R (0.377)** (0.421)*** (0.342)* (0.388)** 
 
Past migration stocks 
    
migration stock (EQ)  -1.004 -0.996 -0.924 -0.909 
share 1990 - low (0.104)*** (0.100)*** (0.108)*** (0.107)*** 
migration stock (EQ)  1.490 1.495 0.809 0.814 
share 1990 - low X R (0.346)*** (0.339)*** (0.308)*** (0.304)*** 
migration stock (EQ) -0.582 -0.567 -0.580 -0.564 
share 1990 - high  (0.189)*** (0.187)*** (0.189)*** (0.186)*** 
migration stock (EQ) 1.224 1.207 -0.458 -0.462 
share 1990 - high X R (1.222) (1.187) (0.273)* (0.270)* 
migration stock (EQ)  1.056 1.030 0.975 0.939 
share 1990 - medium  (0.223)*** (0.222)*** (0.216)*** (0.216)*** 
migration stock (EQ)  -0.882 -0.858 -0.616 -0.586 
share 1990 - medium X R (0.241)*** (0.237)*** (0.243)** (0.244)** 
 
Returns to skills 
    
high- medium & low labor   -4.801  7.413 
ratio in 1990  (host)  (4.454)  (4.475)* 
high- medium & low labor   20.743  12.134 
ratio in 1990 (host ) X F  (8.908)**  (11.026) 
Gini in 1990 (source)  0.954  0.868 
  (0.717)  (0.690) 
Gini in 1990 (source) X R  -0.394  -0.735 
  (0.939)  (0.814) 
Immigration policies     
Total migrant stock  0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.006 
in 1990 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Share of refugees in 1990 0.003 -0.006 -0.008 -0.010 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 384 384 538 538 
R-squared 0.956 0.956 0.938 0.937 
Notes: All the migration stocks are adjusted for the quality of education, i.e. migration stock *EQ; robust standard errors in 
parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.     
     
     
     
     
 
Table 8: Robustness Test: Using Migration Stock Weighted by Educational Quality; IV Estimates  
Dependent Variable: High + Medium & Low Difference in Migration Stock (EQ) Shares in 2000 
 
 
DCs 
(Groups A & B) 
LDCs 
(Groups A & C) 
 
Welfare generosity 
    
Fitted benefits per capita   -1.020 -0.879 -1.107 -0.797 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.600)* (0.444)** (0.528)** (0.432)* 
Fitted benefits per capita   1.885 1.124 1.428 0.859 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) X R (0.567)*** (0.521)** (0.536)*** (0.480)* 
 
Past migration stocks 
    
migration stock (EQ)  -0.465 -0.471 -0.396 -0.399 
share 1990 - low (0.077)*** (0.078)*** (0.081)*** (0.081)*** 
migration stock (EQ)  1.595 1.644 0.310 0.331 
share 1990 - low X R (0.530)*** (0.561)*** (0.207) (0.211) 
migration stock (EQ) 0.773 0.782 0.725 0.716 
share 1990 - high  (0.266)*** (0.263)*** (0.263)*** (0.253)*** 
migration stock (EQ) -0.416 -0.401 -0.478 -0.475 
share 1990 - high X R (0.274) (0.271) (0.268)* (0.258)* 
migration stock (EQ)  0.876 0.876 0.862 0.873 
share 1990 - medium  (0.222)*** (0.219)*** (0.221)*** (0.213)*** 
migration stock (EQ)  0.227 -0.006 0.459 0.466 
share 1990 - medium X R (1.450) (1.545) (0.459) (0.447) 
 
Returns to skills 
    
high- medium & low labor   -1.391  1.478 
ratio in 1990 - (host)  (0.802)*  (0.813)* 
high- medium & low labor  -0.464  -1.586 
ratio in 1990 (host) X F  (1.590)  (1.557) 
Gini in 1990 (source)  2.864 
(0.941)*** 
 2.721 
(0.891)*** 
Gini in 1990 (source) X R  -3.483 
(1.175)*** 
 -2.740 
(1.068)** 
Immigration policies     
Total migrant stock  -0.007 -0.007 -0.012 -0.012 
in 1990 (0.003)*** (0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Share of refugees in 1990 -0.020 -0.017 -0.017 -0.022 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) 
Observations 384 384 538 538 
R-squared 0.964 0.966 0.957 0.958 
Note: All the migration stocks are adjusted for the quality of education, i.e. migration stock *EQ; robust standard errors in 
parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.     
     
   
Appendix 1: 
Table A1: Test Scores 
Group A Group B Group C 
Country EQ Country EQ Country EQ 
Austria 5.089 Australia 5.094 Argentina 3.920 
Belgium 5.041 Canada 5.038 Brazil 3.638 
Switzerland 5.142 Hong Kong 5.195 Chile 4.049 
Denmark 4.962 Israel 4.686 China 4.939 
Spain 4.829 Japan 5.310 Colombia 4.152 
Finland 5.126 Korea, Rep. 5.338 Egypt 4.030 
France 5.040 New Zealand 4.978 Indonesia 3.880 
United 
Kingdom 4.950 Singapore 5.330 India 4.281 
Germany 4.956 
Taiwan 
(Chinese Taipei) 5.452 Iran 4.219 
Greece 4.608 United States 4.903 Jordan 4.264 
Ireland 4.995   Lebanon 3.950 
Italy 4.758   Morocco 3.327 
Netherlands 5.115   Mexico 3.998 
Norway 4.830   Malaysia 4.838 
Portugal 4.564   Nigeria 4.154 
Sweden 5.013   Peru 3.125 
    Philippines 3.647 
    Thailand 4.565 
    Tunisia 3.795 
    Turkey 4.128 
    South Africa 3.089 
Group 
Averages 4.939  5.132  3.999 
Notes: EQ = average test score in math and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided by 100). 
